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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In 1982, responding to concerns that the criminal judicial system often overlooked the
needs of crime victims, the people of California passed Proposition 8. The enactment of
Proposition 8 amended Article I, section 28, of the California Constitution, codifying what is
presently known as “The Victims’ Bill of Rights” (“VBR”). Cal. Const. art. I, § 28. Proposition
9 now seeks to amend the current VBR, and would create what is known as the “Victims’ Bill of
Rights Act of 2008: Marsy’s Law.” Secretary of State, Official Voter Information Guide, Text of
Proposed Law, Proposition 9: Criminal Justice System. Victims’ Rights. Parole. Initiative
Constitutional Amendment and Statute. http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/text-proposedlaws/text-of-proposed-laws.pdf#prop9 (accessed Oct. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Proposition 9].
If adopted, Proposition 9 would modify the California Constitution, amending and adding
substantial provisions to Article I, section 28. It would also alter California’s statutory scheme
by amending two statutes, Penal Code sections 3041.5(a) and 3043, and by adding two others,
Penal Code sections 3044 and 679.026. Substantively, this initiative will place more restrictions
on sentencing, limit parole proceedings, and condense the rights of criminal defendants,
convicted persons, and parolees. Contemporaneously, Proposition 9 would enlarge the rights of
crime victims and expand the scope of the VBR.
Ratification of Proposition 9 will have considerable impact on California’s justice
system; however, some of its multifarious changes would result only in marginal changes in the
law. For example, in the interest of school safety, this initiative would augment the definition of
schools by incorporating “community colleges, colleges, and universities.” Proposition 9 §
28(a)(7) (emphasis added). Therefore, the following analysis will focus predominately on the
major substantive changes proposed by Proposition 9. According to the Legislative Analyst’s
Office (“LAO”), the main changes of Proposition 9 are threefold. Primarily, this measure would:
“(1) expand the legal rights of victims and the payment of restitution by criminal offenders; (2)
restrict the early release of inmates; and (3) change the procedures for granting and revoking
parole.” LAO, Proposition 9: Criminal Justice System, Victims’ Rights, Parole, Initiative
Constitutional Amendment and Statute. 1, http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2008/9_11_2008.pdf
(July 2008) [hereinafter LAO, Proposition 9].
If adopted, Proposition 9 is likely to be challenged on the grounds that it conflicts with
both federal and state constitutional provisions. Notwithstanding conflicts with preexisting law,
Proposition 9 could place significant financial burdens on the Legislature, the California
Department of Corrections, California courts, and the taxpayers. Alternatively, if it succeeds in
reducing parole hearings, and abolishes the right to state appointed counsel, ratification of
Proposition 9 could result in significant savings.
II. THE LAW
A. Existing Law
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Over the past 60 years, the law regarding victims’ rights has undergone dramatic
transformation, especially in California. “In 1965, California became the first state in the nation
to create a crime victim compensation program.” Symposium, Leadership Issues in Criminal
Justice Policy: Victims' Rights and Services: A Historical Perspective and Goals for the TwentyFirst Century, 33 McGeorge L. Rev. 673, 675 (2002). Again, in 1972, California was among
three pioneering states to enact a victims’ assistance program when it founded Bay Area Women
Against Rape. Id. In 1974, Chief Probation Officer Jim Rowland, of Fresno County,
successfully implemented the first “victim impact statement,” providing judges with deeper
insight regarding the impact of crime on victims. Id.
Despite apparent progress, the resounding sentiment of the State was that victims were
still overlooked and mistreated by California’s criminal justice system. In response to this
frustration, and in order to provide more effective protection to crime victims, California
lawmakers created a comprehensive set of victims’ rights that could be applied across the State.
Proposition 8, voted on and approved in 1982, codifies what is known as “The Victims’ Bill of
Rights.” Cal. Const. art I, § 28. In 1990 voters passed Proposition 115, the “Crime Victims'
Justice Reform Act,” adding two significant provisions to the California Constitution: Article I,
section 14.1, eliminating post indictment preliminary hearings; and Article I, section 29, giving
the public the right to due process and a speedy trial. Cal. Const. art I, §§ 14.1, 29 (2008) (Notes
of Decisions 1990).
Today, the law regarding victims’ rights involves a complex amalgamation of
constitutional and statutory provisions that encompass more than just the rights of victims;
integrating victims’ rights, public rights, the rights of the accused, the rights of the convicted,
and the rights of parolees. Due to such intricacy, Proposition 9 is best parsed into the following
two categories: (1) victims’ rights and restitution; and (2) sentencing, parole and parole
revocation.
1. Victims’ Rights and Restitution
Though not constitutionally defined, the Legislature commonly provides a definition of
the term “victim” within a statutory scheme. People v. Tackett, 144 Cal. App. 4th 445 (3d Dist.
2006). One statute describes a victim as “any natural person with respect to whom there is
reason to believe that any crime as defined under the laws of this state or any other state or of the
United States is being or has been perpetrated or attempted to be perpetrated.” Cal. Pen. Code
Ann. § 136(3) (Lexis 2008). Title 17 of the California Penal Code simply states, a victim is “a
person against whom a crime has been committed.” Cal. Pen. Code Ann. § 679.01 (Lexis 2008).
Each statutory provision that incorporates the phrase, “victim of a crime,” offers a slightly
nuanced characterization of the term victim. Whereas some statutes rely on the specific
language of a crime to define victim, most statutes in the criminal law context, such as the
foregoing, rely on broad language to encompass crimes in general.
As the law stands, victims have the right to be notified, as well as the right to appear and
to be heard at sentencing and parole proceedings. E.g. Cal. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 679.02(a)(3)-(5),
1191.1, 3043(a)-(e) (Lexis 2008). Similarly, notice requirements regarding release and re-entry
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programs are regulated by California’s Penal Code. See generally Cal. Pen. Code Ann. §§
11155-11158 (Lexis 2008).
Victims are also entitled to have family members or representatives attend and testify at
sentencing and parole hearings. By statute, parents or guardians of a victim may attend a
sentencing hearing if the victim is a minor. Cal. Pen. Code Ann. § 1191.1 (Lexis 2008). If the
victim is deceased, section 1191.1 grants the next of kin the right to attend a sentencing hearing.
Id. Correspondingly, Penal Code section 3043(b) permits the victim’s next of kin, two members
of their immediate family, or two representatives to appear personally or by counsel at a parole
hearing. Cal. Pen. Code Ann. § 3043(b) (Lexis 2008). With regard to sentencing testimony,
attending parties retain a right to “reasonably express his, her, or their views concerning the
crime, the person responsible, and the need for restitution.” Cal. Pen. Code Ann. § 1191.1 (Lexis
2008). Likewise, section 3043 also guarantees individuals attending a parole hearing an
opportunity to provide a statement. Cal. Pen. Code Ann. § 3043 (Lexis 2008). In addition to the
limited number of people that may attend, there are certain restrictions on the content of
testimony provided at a hearing. For example, if a statement is provided by a representative or
next of kin, the content of that statement is limited to comments “concerning the effect of the
crime on the victim.” Id. Not only are attendees given an opportunity to provide statements,
under the current statutory scheme, courts must take into account theses statements for the
purposes of determining both sentencing and parole. Cal. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 1191.1, 3043(e)
(Lexis 2008).
Finally, restitution is compulsory under the California Constitution, “unless compelling
and extraordinary reasons exist to the contrary.” Cal. Const. art. I, § 28(b). This mandates
restitution from the convicted person regardless of the sentence; though, under the current
scheme, the court reserves discretionary power to determine whether there are circumstances that
justify relieving the defendant of this obligation. Cal. Const. art. I., §§ 28(a), (b).
2. Sentencing, Parole, and Parole Revocation
Because sentencing, parole, and parole revocation hearings each involve a distinct liberty
interest, it is important to distinguish the three proceedings. Sentencing typically occurs at the
conclusion of a trial, and often results in imprisonment. During incarceration, a prisoner may be
granted parole, which means a conditional release from prison. In contrast, a parole revocation
hearing occurs when a parolee is accused of violating a condition of parole, and is thus in
jeopardy of returning to prison.
Sentencing and parole guidelines are primarily controlled by constitutional and statutory
authority. The Penal Code, for instance, augments the federally protected right to counsel by
providing a statutory right to counsel at any hearing for the purpose “of setting, postponing, or
rescinding a parole release date of a prisoner under a life sentence.” Cal. Pen. Code Ann. §
3041.7 (Lexis 2008). Additionally, pursuant to statute, a prisoner retains the right to attend and
participate in his or her parole hearing. Cal. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 3041.5(a)(1)-(5) (Lexis 2008).
The prisoner also has the right to ask and answer questions, as well as an opportunity to speak on
his or her behalf at a parole hearing. Id. § 3041.5(a)(2). This section also provides time
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regulations regarding a prisoner’s right to review files, notification of the Parole Board's
decision, re-hearing, and other scheduling procedures. Id.
Case precedent also helps shape the law regarding parole and parole revocation hearings.
One opinion, issued by the U.S. Supreme Court, establishes the following minimal due process
guarantees for parolees at a parole revocation hearing:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee
of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present
witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not
allowing confrontation); (e) a "neutral and detached" hearing body such as a
traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or
lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the fact finders as to the evidence relied on
and reasons for revoking parole. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
A recent California decision, involving a federal court order issued in response to a
parolee class-action suit, also provides critical due process guidelines for parolees. LAO,
Proposition 9, supra at 4; accord. Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger, 548 F. Supp. 2d 852 (E.D. Cal.
2008); Valdivia v. Davis, 206 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (E.D. Cal. 2002). In order to determine whether
there is probable cause to detain a parolee while the issue is resolved, Valdivia ensures a
probable cause hearing within 10 days of being charged with a parole violation. Id. This federal
court order also mandates resolution of revocation charges within 35 days of being arrested for
parole violations. Id. Finally, and perhaps most critical, the Valdivia edict requires that all
parolees be provided legal counsel. Id.
B. Proposed Changes and Effects
1. Victims’ Rights and Restitution
Under Proposition 9’s amended VBR, the term “victim” would be constitutionally
defined as follows:
As used in this section, a ‘victim’ is a person who suffers direct or threatened
physical, psychological, or financial harm as a result of the commission or
attempted commission of a crime or delinquent act. The term “victim” also
includes the person’s spouse, parents, children, siblings, or guardian, and includes
a lawful representative of a crime victim who is deceased, a minor, or physically
or psychologically incapacitated. The term “victim” does not include a person in
custody for an offense, the accused. Proposition 9 § 28(e).
Broadening the definition of “victim” will make these rights available to a larger class of people.
This may have considerable impact given the breadth of victims’ rights under Proposition 9.
In general, Proposition 9 would: (1) protect victims from individuals accused of
committing crimes against them; (2) provide the victim the right to a speedy trial; (3) provide
7

that the safety of the victim and the victim’s family will be considered in fixing the amount of
bail and release conditions for the defendant; (4) maintain that the safety of the victim, the
victim’s family and all members of the public shall be taken into consideration when addressing
parole; (5) make restitution mandatory, repealing the section allowing discretionary exceptions;
and (6) mandate that any money collected by law enforcement or courts must first be applied to
restitution. Id. § 28; see also LAO, Proposition 9, supra at 1-2.
Among the paramount changes to victims’ rights, Proposition 9 would expand the right to
be notified, to attend, and to be heard at various criminal proceedings. Extinguishing previous
restrictions, Proposition 9 extends these rights to all public criminal proceedings, including the
following: post arrest proceedings, post conviction hearings, delinquency hearings, and “any
proceeding in which a right of the victim is at issue.” Id. Victims would also be eligible to
receive notification 90 days in advance of a parole consideration hearing, as opposed to the 30
day notice presently granted. LAO, Proposition 9, supra at 3.
Proposition 9 would also establish an absolute right to “refuse an interview, deposition,
or discovery request by the defendant, the defendant’s attorney, or any other person acting on
behalf of the defendant.” Proposition 9 § 28(b)(5) (emphasis added). Further, victims would be
allowed to prevent the disclosure of confidential information. Id. § 28(b)(4) (emphasis added).
A victim does not generally have to acquiesce to defense investigation requests; however, in
certain instances a victim’s medical records and other confidential material may be accessed at
the court’s discretion. E.g., Cal. Evid. Code Ann. §§ 1043-47 (Lexis 2008); see also Noor
Dawood, Prison Law Office, Proposition 9: Summary and Analysis, 8, 12
http://www.prisonlaw.com/pdfs/Prop9Summary.pdf (September 2008) [hereinafter Dawood,
Proposition 9] (summary created “with technical input from UnCommon Law and Rosen Bien
and Galvan LLP”). If there is no alternative to obtaining information, an attorney may subpoena
a witness or discoverable material. Proposition 9 would abolish such rights. Some opine that,
while this provision may have nominal effects on criminal proceedings, the consequences in civil
proceedings could be significant. Dawood, Proposition 9, supra at 8. Nonetheless, legal battles
are foreseeable as a result of an absolute foreclosure on discoverable information.
Proposition 9 also purports to furnish victims a constitutional right to “reasonably confer
with the prosecuting agency…regarding, the arrest of the defendant…the charges filed, the
determination whether to extradite the defendant, and upon request, to be notified of and
informed before any pretrial disposition of the case.” Proposition 9 § 28(b)(6) (emphasis added).
This could have dramatic effect on the criminal justice system. In criminal proceedings, the
prosecuting attorney represents the State. Ultimately, the State brings the charge(s) against a
defendant. Requisite victim participation may complicate prosecution efforts. Coupled with a
high degree of emotional investment, a victim is unlikely to have the legal sophistication
required to prosecute a defendant. For example, while a more serious charge may carry a heavier
penalty, thus appealing to a victim, an attorney presumably knows if the evidence is sufficient to
sustain such a charge. If the prosecution pursues a more serious charge at the insistence of the
victim, but lacks sufficient evidence to support the charge, a jury could acquit the defendant.
Finally, it is worth noting that specific to the proposed Constitutional amendments,
ratification of Proposition 9 would add a provision stating that “a victim, the retained attorney of
8

a victim, a lawful representative of the victim, or the prosecuting attorney upon request of the
victim, may enforce the rights enumerated in subdivision (b) in any trial or appellate court with
jurisdiction over the case as a matter of right.” Proposition 9 § 28(c)(1). Those rights under
subsection (b) include, but are not limited to, the right to be reasonably protected from the
defendant or others acting on the defendants behalf, the right to a speedy trial, the right to refuse
discovery, the right to confer with the prosecution, and the right to restitution. While it does not
provide for compensatory damages, Proposition 9 clearly sets forth a legal remedy in order for
victims of crime to enforce subsection (b) of the amended VBR.
2. Sentencing, Parole, and Parole Revocation
With respect to sentencing, Proposition 9 establishes that victims have a right to “expect
that persons convicted…are sufficiently punished in both the manner and the length of the
sentences.” Proposition 9 § 28(a)(5) (emphasis added). Under Proposition 9, “punitive and
deterrent effect of custodial sentences imposed by the courts will not be undercut or diminished
by the granting of rights and privileges to prisoners that are not required by any provision of the
United States Constitution or by the laws of this state.” Id. (emphasis added). In conjunction
with this provision, Proposition 9 incorporates a subsection decreeing that sentences “shall be
carried out in compliance with the courts’ sentencing orders, and shall not be substantially
diminished by early release policies intended to alleviate overcrowding in custodial facilities.”
Id. § 28(f)(5) (emphasis added). Under this provision, the “legislative branch shall ensure
sufficient funding to adequately house inmates for the full terms of their sentences, except for
statutorily authorized credits which reduce those sentences.” Id. The effects of these sentencing
provisions would limit courts’ discretionary power to determine the length and severity of a
sentence, and restrict its ability to consider mitigating circumstances that may lessen a sentence.
As a result of Proposition 9, sentences may increase, while parole and release opportunities
become less frequent. This could in turn increase costs and compound prison overcrowding.
Of the changes envisaged by the proponents of Proposition 9, adjustments to parole and
parole revocation hearings are critical. Presently, individuals facing life sentences typically wait
between 1 and 5 years for another parole hearing. Proposition 9 would extend the time between
hearings from between 3 to 15 years. However, inmates would be able to periodically request
that the board advance the hearing date. LAO, Proposition 9, supra at 3-4. In terms of general
parole revocation procedures, parolees are presently entitled to a probable cause hearing within
10 business days after being charged with violation of parole, this initiative would extend that to
15 days. Id. at 4. Parolees are also entitled to a hearing to resolve revocation charges within 35
days and this measure would extend that to 45 days. Id.
While there is currently a cap on the number of people allowed to testify at various
hearings, Proposition 9 would alleviate most of these restrictions. Proposition 9 § 3043(b)(1)
(emphasis added). Proposition 9 alters various provisions to accord victims, family,
representatives, or their counsel the right to appear and provide statements at parole hearings. Id.
§ 3043. The measure also includes a provision permitting the court, in its discretion, to allow
any person harmed by the defendant/offender to be heard at sentencing and parole hearings. Id.
§ 28(d). Proposition 9 thereby forestalls potential limits on the number of attendees that may be
heard at parole and opens the door to virtually anyone willing to testify.
9

Proposition 9 would also broaden the content of statements made at parole hearings. For
example, this initiative would allow those attending a parole hearing to express their views with
respect to “the prisoner and the case, including, but not limited to the commitment crimes,
determinate term commitment crimes for which the prisoner has been paroled…the person
responsible…and the suitability of the prisoner for parole.” Id. § 3043(b)(2). This provision
excludes any qualifying language before the phrase, “the person responsible,” which suggests
that an individual may discuss anything remotely related to the prisoner. Effectively, Proposition
9 would grant wide latitude regarding the content of parole hearing testimony.
Furthermore, this initiative would explicitly prohibit the prisoner and his or her attorney,
from asking questions of any person at a parole hearing pursuant to subdivision (b) of section
3043. Id. § 3041.5. Proposition 9 would also proscribe any interruption of testimony given by
the victim(s), next of kin, immediate family members, and the representative of the victim. Id. §
3043(d). In effect, Proposition 9 would allow innumerable, unrestricted statements to be made at
parole hearings, while simultaneously barring the prisoner and her attorney from asking
questions or interrupting this testimony. Id. § 3041.5. While victims are entitled to provide the
last statement at a parole hearing, the person in charge of the hearing has the discretion to redress
objectionable testimony. Cal. Pen. Code Ann. § 3043.6 (Lexis 2008). Consequently,
Proposition 9 would preclude discretionary objections or rebuttal to any statements made.
Dawood, Proposition 9, supra at 5, 12.
Proposition 9 would also implement various restrictions on parole revocation hearings by
adding Penal Code section 3044, purporting to eradicate all other procedural rights except those
provided in section 3044. This provision states in pertinent part:
[a] parolee shall, upon request be entitled to counsel at state expense only if,
considering the request on a case-by-case basis, the board or its hearing officers
determine: (A) the parolee is indigent; and (B) considering the complexity of the
charges…defense….mental or educational capacity, he or she appears incapable
of speaking effectively in his or her own defense.” Proposition 9 §3044(a)(3)
(emphasis added).
Section 3044 would also stipulate that “admission of...recorded or hearsay evidence of a victim
or percipient witness shall not be construed to create a right to confront the witness at the
hearing.” Id. § 3044(a)(6). Thus, Proposition 9 imposes a restraint on courts’ interpretive
powers to construe the constitutional right to confront a witness.
III. DRAFTING ISSUES
A. Ambiguity in Language
Normally, courts will apply the same method to determine the meaning of an initiative as
they would when interpreting statutes. Professional Engineers in California Government v.
Kempton, 40 Cal. 4th 1016, 1037 (2007). The court must “turn first to the language of the
[initiative], giving the words their ordinary meaning.” Id. Kempton further asserted,
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“[t]he…language must also be construed in the context of the statute as a whole,” taking into
account the overall scheme. Id. at 1037 (citing People v. Rizo, 22 Cal. 4th 681, 685 (2000)).
Where there is ambiguity in the language of the measure, “[b]allot summaries and arguments
may be considered when determining the voters' intent and understanding of a ballot measure.”
Id. (citing Legislature v. Deukmejian 34 Cal. 3d 658, 673 (1983)). The California Supreme
Court further asserts that, when dealing with ambiguity of language, “we consider extrinsic
evidence in determining voter intent, including the Legislative Analyst's analysis and ballot
arguments for and against the initiative.” Silicon Valley Taxpayers' Assn., Inc. v. Santa Clara
County Open Space Authority, 44 Cal. 4th 431, 445 (2008).
The expansive definition of “victim” could present a challenge with respect to
interpretation. It is particularly significant because, should Proposition 9 pass, the status as
victim would guarantee substantial procedural rights. Proposition 9 defines victim as “a person
who suffers direct or threatened physical, psychological, or financial harm as a result of the
commission or attempted commission of a crime or delinquent act.” Proposition 9 § 28(e)
(emphasis added). Arguably, the phrase can be read narrowly, limiting its scope to individuals
contemporaneously affected by the commission of a crime, or broadly, including tangentially
affected parties that are far removed from the actual crime. More importantly, however, what
constitutes “threatened” under the proposed scheme is not readily apparent. It is difficult to
extrapolate how a court would construe the term “threatened,” given what little is discussed
about it in the text, arguments, and analysis of Proposition 9. “Threatened” is ostensibly akin to
the term “attempted,” implying possibility or potential. Given the breadth of Proposition 9, this
definition of victim could potentially apply to anyone possibly affected by a crime, irrespective
of how remote the impact.
B. Severability
Proposition 9 includes a severability clause providing that if any section, or the
application of any provision, is determined to be invalid or unconstitutional, the remaining
provisions that can “be given effect without the invalid or unconstitutional provision…shall
remain in full force and effect.” Proposition 9 Section 8.
The inclusion of a severability clause is not alone dispositive. Calfarm Ins. Co. v.
Deukmejian, 48 Cal. 3d 805, 821 (1989). Instead, courts consistently apply a three-part test to
determine whether an invalid provision in a given measure may permissively be severed from the
initiative. Severance is permissible if it is “grammatically, functionally, and volitionally
separable.” Gerken v. Fair Political Practices Comm., 6 Cal. 4th 707, 714 (1993). In order to
satisfy the grammatically severable prong, the “language of the statute [must be] mechanically
severable, that is, where the valid and invalid parts can be separated by paragraph, sentence,
clause, phrase, or even single words.” People's Advocate v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d
316, 330 (3rd Dist. 1986) (italics original). Concomitant to the severable section being
“grammatically complete and distinct,” the functional test requires that removal of any such
section must not impair the integrity of the remaining text. As Peoples Advocate explains, the
remaining text must be capable of being given full effect without the omitted portion; the
remaining portion must not be “rendered vague” by the removal of a section, nor be “inextricably
connected to them by policy.” Id. at 331-32. Finally, the remaining initiative must be that which
11

the legislative body would have adopted without the omitted portions. Relying on People’s
Advocate, the Court in Gerken articulated this test to mean: “whether it can be said with
confidence that the electorate’s attention was sufficiently focused upon the parts to be severed so
that it would have separately considered and adopted them in the absence of the invalid
portions.” Gerken, supra, 6 Cal. 4th at 714-15. Without the omitted portion, the measure must
still achieve its original intended purpose. Because Proposition 9 includes a severability clause,
the analysis established under Deukmejian, People's Advocate, and Gerken, will apply.
If the sections susceptible to challenge were omitted, it is unlikely that their deletion
would vitiate the initiative to the extent that credence could not be given to the remaining
portions. The majority of Proposition 9 is separated into distinct sections, so omitting one
section would not compromise the integrity of surrounding sections. For instance, if the portion
providing the victims absolute right to refuse all discovery requests of the defendant was
invalidated and subsequently omitted, the remainder of Proposition 9 would not be, under
Gerken, rendered grammatically incoherent, functionally ineffective, or contrary to the
purpose(s) for which it was originally enacted. Because of the voluminous changes proposed in
Proposition 9, it is difficult to account for every provision that could potentially be invalidated.
For the most part, those portions vulnerable to challenges are likely to be severable on their own.
However, if in the aggregate each provision susceptible to challenge was invalidated, the
remaining portion of Proposition 9 would be unable to meet the three part test espoused in
Gerken.
C. Conflicts with Concurrent Ballot Measures
A conflict may arise when the ratification of one initiative inhibits the enforcement of
provisions in another initiative that is approved during the same election. The efficacy of the
provisions that are in conflict are analyzed under Gerken, which explains, as between two
competing initiatives on the ballot, “only the provisions of the measure receiving the highest
number of affirmative votes [can] be enforced.” Gerken, supra, 6 Cal. 4th at 710; Cal. Const. art
II, § 10(b).
Currently there are two other initiatives on the November ballot that implicate the
criminal justice system. Proposition 5 expands drug treatment programs, and provides early
release provisions in order to promote rehabilitation programs. It significantly modifies parole
and prison release programs, extending more parole opportunities for certain non-violent
offenses. Proposition 5, Nonviolent Drug Offenses: Sentencing, Parole and Rehabilitation.
Initiative Statute, Analysis by the Legislative Analyst
http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/analysis/prop5-analysis.htm (2008). Similarly, Proposition 6
contains a number of sentence enhancing provisions and modifications to criminal law.
Proposition 6, Police and Law enforcement Funding. Criminal Penalties and Laws. Initiative
Statute., Analysis by the Legislative Analyst (2008),
http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/analysis/prop5-analysis.htm. Proposition 6 is more aligned
with Proposition 9, and there is unlikely to be extensive conflict between the two. However,
Proposition 5 contains provisions that, if ratified, are antithetical to the intended purpose of
Proposition 9. The more frequent opportunity for parole, and shortened periods of incarceration
contradict Proposition 9’s explicit edict that sentences not be cut short, and parole opportunities
12

be less frequent. See Proposition 9 §§ 28(a)(5), (f)(5). Thus, if a court is unable to harmonize
provisions within the two statutes, the provisions of the statute with the most votes will prevail.
D. Conflicts with Preexisting Law
If Proposition 9 passes, courts will be confronted with two countervailing interests, the
enumerated rights in the amended VBR and the rights already infused in federal and state laws.
As between two irreconcilable provisions covering the rights of victims, Proposition 9 expressly
provides: “It is the intent of the People of the State of California in enacting this act that if any
provision in this act conflicts with an existing provision of law which provides for greater rights
of victims of crime, the latter provision shall apply.” Proposition 9 Section 7. A more difficult
conundrum arises when the victims’ rights conflict with concurrent rights provided to defendants
or parolees. Proposition 9 is silent on that issue.
It is well settled that courts must try to harmonize conflicting laws so as to avoid
trumping one in favor of the other. E.g. City and County of San Francisco v. County of San
Mateo, 10 Cal. 4th 554, 563, 570-571, fn. 8 (1995). In the case of two conflicting laws, “[a]
specific provision relating to a particular subject will govern in respect to that subject, as against
a general provision.” San Francisco Taxpayers Assn. v. Board of Supervisors, 2 Cal. 4th 571,
577 (1992). In contrast, “two statutes dealing with the same subject are given concurrent effect
if they can be harmonized, even though one is specific and the other general.” People v. Price, 1
Cal. 4th 324, 385 (1991). In determining which statute prevails, courts also look to which was
last in time; the more recently enacted statutes trump prior statutes. People v. Moody, 96 Cal.
App. 4th 987, 993 (3d Dist. 2002) (citing Collection Bureau of San Jose v. Rumsey, 24 Cal. 4th
301, 310 (2000)).
Under the current statutory scheme the prosecution is compelled to disclose to the
defendant, “all relevant real evidence seized or obtained as part of the investigation of the
offense charged…[and] any exculpatory evidence.” Cal. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 1054.1(c), (e)
(Lexis 2008); see also Cal. Pen. Code Ann. § 1054.9(a) (Lexis 2008) (establishing the right to
discovery for materials for a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a
judgment in a case in which a sentence of death or life in prison without parole have been
imposed). Additionally, certain confidential materials, such as medical records, may be
subpoenaed and could potentially be discoverable under the present scheme. California’s
Evidence Code allows certain violent character traits of a victim to be introduced as evidence in
criminal cases. Cal. Evid. Code Ann. § 1103 (Lexis 2008). Likewise, the Evidence Code also
permits information from confidential police files to be admitted in certain instances. Id. §§
1043-47. Proposition 9 would immunize victims from any discovery request, and would prevent
the disclosure of confidential information. E.g. Proposition 9 §§ 28(b)(4), (b)(5). While the
blanket right to refuse discovery, interview requests, or depositions, may violate basic
constitutional rights to confront witnesses, it also conflicts with the foregoing statutory
provisions. Consider a defendant who is accused of resisting arrest and battery on an officer. If
his defense is self-defense, under Proposition 9, he would be unable to bring into evidence the
officer’s propensity for violence or his violent record, as provided by the Evidence Code,
because the officer in this instance would also be a victim. The defense is therefore eviscerated.
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A. Federal
In addition to the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, it is well established that
“[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the State to disclose to
criminal defendants favorable evidence that is material either to guilt or punishment.” California
v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 480-81 (1984) (italics original) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963)). Furthermore, In Re Sassounian, 9 Cal. 4th 535, 544 (1995), stands for the
proposition that material is favorable if it “helps the defendant, or hurts the prosecution.” Under
the Supreme Court’s interpretation, if there is reason to believe the material requested would
have altered the outcome of the trial, then it is “material” for the purposes of Brady discovery.
Charles M. Denton, 26 Things I Wish I’d Known My First Year as a Public Defender (2000)
http://www.cpda.org/claraweb/Files/Misc/26Things.htm (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S.
667, 682 (1985). An unequivocal right to refuse discovery, or to prevent the disclosure of
confidential information, as proposed by Proposition 9, could be challenged on the grounds that
it contravenes Brady and its progeny. See Proposition 9 §§ 28(b)(5), (4).
It is well established that “California's parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty
interest in release on parole.” E.g. McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F. 3d 895, 904 (9th Cir. 2002).
Having established this, the proper due process analysis requires a court to “examine whether the
deprivation of that interest lacked adequate procedural protections and therefore violated due
process. Id. at 903. The court in Morrissey established minimum due process requirements that
must be satisfied at parole revocation hearings, including, but not limited to: disclosure of
evidence against the parolee; an opportunity to be heard, to present witnesses and documentary
evidence; and the right to “confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing
officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation).” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 489 (1972). Proposition 9 abridges a parolee’s right to counsel and expressly provides
that, “admission of recorded or hearsay statement[s]…shall not be construed to create a right to
confront the witness at the hearing.” Proposition 9 § 3044(a)(3), (6). If ratified, this provision is
likely to be challenged for failure to comport with the holding in Morrissey and fails to satisfy
due process rights of the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court.
B. California
1. Due Process
Complementing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Morrissey, the recent court order
issued in Valdivia mandates certain scheduling procedures and time-lines guiding parole and
parole revocation hearings. LAO, Proposition 9, supra at 4 (noting Valdivia, supra, 548 F.
Supp. 2d 852). This initiative seeks to modify these procedural deadlines. As a result, if
Proposition 9 was ratified, courts would be forced to reconcile these provisions with the Valdivia
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decree. Id. Moreover, Proposition 9 will also have to square with the Valdivia edict that
parolees are entitled to legal counsel at parole revocation hearings. Id.
Further, the addition of section 3044 would stipulate that “admission of...recorded or
hearsay evidence of a victim or percipient witness shall not be construed to create a right to
confront the witness at the hearing.” Id. § 3055(a)(6). Not only does this provision run counter
to the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Morrissey, it may be challenged for failure to square with
California’s right to confront witnesses. Such a mandate would deprive the courts of their
interpretive power to determine what may or may not be construed as creating a right to confront
a witness.
Finally, Proposition 9 imposes virtually no limit to how many people may testify at
hearings, and further purports to abdicate any restrictions on the subject matter of their
statements. Proposition 9 § 3043 et seq. Simultaneously, Proposition 9 purports to amend Penal
Code Section 3041.5 to obviate the right of either the parolee or her attorney to question any of
those individuals allowed to attend under section 3043. Id. § 3041.5. Presently, the victim, or
attendees authorized to appear pursuant to statute, are accorded the right to speak last before the
board. Cal. Pen. Code Ann. § 3043.6 (Lexis 2008). Currently, the person presiding at a hearing
has the discretion to ensure that only “accurate and relevant statements are considered in
determining parole suitability… including, but not limited to, the rebuttal of inaccurate
statements made by any party.” Id. Thus Proposition 9 would erode procedural safeguards
employed to thwart irrelevant or fabricated testimony. Dawood, Proposition 9, supra at 5, 12.
2. Single-Subject Rule
Section 8, Article II, of the California Constitution provides that “an initiative measure
embracing more than one subject may not be submitted to the electors or have any effect.” Cal.
Const. art II, §8(d). Courts have developed what is known as the “reasonably germane” test in
order to determine whether a statute satisfies this provision. Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d
236, 245 (1982) (citing Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. V. State Bd. Of Equalization,
22 Cal. 3d 208, 230 (1978)). The court in Senate v. Jones articulated the standard this way:
“[a]n initiative measure does not violate the single-subject requirement if, despite its varied
collateral effects, all of its parts are 'reasonably germane' to each other, and to the general
purpose or object of the initiative.” Senate v. Jones, 21 Cal. 4th 1142, 1157 (1999) (citing
Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 512 (1991) (italics original). Jones goes on to clarify that this
does not mandate that each provision in an initiative be interconnected in a “functional
relationship.” Rather, “it is enough that the various provisions are reasonably related to a
common theme or purpose.” Id. (citing Eu, supra, 54 Cal. 3d at 513). The important criterion
established in Jones requires “a reasonable and common sense relationship among their various
components in furtherance of a common purpose.” Id. at 512.
Jurisprudence regarding the single-subject rule reflects a very flexible interpretation and
application of the rule, indicative, as one law review article points out, of “an exceedingly
expansive reach afforded to criminal justice initiatives.” Symposium, Leadership Issues in
Criminal Justice Policy: Something for Everyone? The Future of Comprehensive Criminal
Justice Initiatives After Senate v. Jones and Manduley v. Superior Court, 33 McGeorge L. Rev.
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779, 779 (2002). Among four major criminal justice initiatives in the last twenty years, three
have been challenged on the grounds that they violated the single-subject rule. Despite the
challenges, “California courts have never struck down a criminal justice initiative for violation of
the single-subject rule.” Id. at 782-83.
Brosnahan is likely to control the outcome of a challenge based on the single-subject
rule. Brosnahan, supra, 32 Cal. 3d 236. There, the Court upheld the purpose as being
reasonably germane to the general subject, or object, as was articulated in the title, i.e.,
“promoting the rights of actual or potential crime victims.” Id. at 247. In Brosnahan, the
harsher punishments and collateral effects on the criminal justice system, sentences, etc., were
deemed to function in direct relation to the aimed purpose of protecting potential victims and the
public. Id. Brosnahan demonstrates that the rights of victims, the public, the accused, and the
incarcerated are inextricably bound to one another. Based on precedent, the likelihood of
invalidating Proposition 9 on the grounds that it violates the single-subject rule is highly
improbable.
3. Revision Versus Amendment
The people of the state of California are vested the power to amend constitutional
provisions through the initiative process. Cal. Const., art. XVIII, § 3. However, this provision
only permits “amendment” and does not contemplate “revision” of the Constitution. “A
‘revision’ may only be accomplished by convening a constitutional convention and obtaining
popular ratification…or by legislative submission of the measure to the voters.” Raven v.
Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 349 (1990) (citing Cal. Const., art. XVIII, §§ 1, 2). Courts have
developed a two-prong test in order to differentiate amendment from revision. Explicating the
revision/amendment analysis, Raven establishes the following: “[it] has a dual aspect, requiring
us to examine both the quantitative and qualitative effects of the measure on our constitutional
scheme. Substantial changes in either respect could amount to a revision.” Id. at 350.
The quantitative effect analyzes whether the initiative consists of extensive provisions
that result in numerous deletions or alterations of the existing laws, such that it directly changes
the “substantial entirety of the Constitution.” Amador, supra, 22 Cal. 3d at 223; see also Julia
Anne Guizan, Student Author, Notes and Comment: Is The California Civil Rights Initiative a
Wolf In Sheep’s Clothing?: Distinguishing Constitutional Amendment From Revision in
California’s Initiative Process, 31 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 261, 267 (1997). A provision that changes
voluminous portions of constitutional doctrine could be rendered invalid. In one case, for
example, the court invalidated an initiative that contained 12 sections, 208 subsections, more that
21,000 words, and would have repealed at least 15 of 25 articles. Guizan, supra, 31 Loy. L.A. L.
Rev. 261, 267 (citing McFadden v. Jordan, 32 Cal. 2d 330, 334 (1948)). Though Proposition 9
contains numerous changes, based on quantity alone, it is improbable that a court would
conclude that it rises to the level of an impermissible revision. In Raven, for example, the
initiative at issue, a provision in Proposition 115, altered only a few provisions and was therefore
distinguishable from cases like McFadden. Ultimately, it failed to satisfy the quantitative
standard in the two-pronged test. Raven, supra, 52 Cal. 3d at 351. Proposition 9 involves more
significant modifications than Proposition 115, nonetheless it is distinguishable from cases like
McFadden.
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Conducting a qualitative analysis, however, the Court in Raven observed that Proposition
115 divested the judicial branch of all “interpretive power,” particularly with respect to criminal
defense rights, and turned that power over to the U.S. Supreme Court. Id. at 352. Proposition
115 attempted to restrict the courts’ ability to provide more protection to criminal defendants
than the federal Constitution. Id. at 352. Raven concluded that the portion of the initiative that
abdicated California courts’ interpretive power and vested it in the federal courts was a
substantial alteration of “the preexisting constitutional scheme.” Id. at 354. According to Raven,
this impermissible alteration rose to the level of “an invalid revision of the California
Constitution.” Id. at 355. However, relying on the severability clause, Raven determined that
the provision of Proposition 115 that was rendered invalid could properly be severed from the
remaining portions of the initiative. Thus, only that portion the court ruled invalid was stricken
from the initiative.
Distinguishable from Raven, the petitioners in Brosnahan challenged Proposition 8 on
similar grounds, but were ultimately unsuccessful. Brosnahan, supra, 32 Cal. 3d 236. There, the
court determined that, while the scope of Proposition 8 would substantially change the criminal
justice system, it would not constitute “such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a revision.” Id. at 260 (citing McFadden, supra, at 348)
(italics original). Therefore, Raven and Brosnahan represent two possible ends of the spectrum.
In contrast to the Proposition 8 addressed in Brosnahan, Proposition 9 contains expansive
modification to the justice system, including a more explicit restriction on the courts’
discretionary powers. For example, Proposition 9 states that, during a parole revocation hearing,
recorded or hearsay statements of a victim or witness will not be “construed as a right to confront
the witness at the hearing.” Proposition 9 § 3044(a)(6). A court will have to reconcile this
limiting instruction in order to square it with the courts’ exclusive function to interpret
constitutional rights. It is hard to predict whether a court would find the provisions of
Proposition 9 insufficient to warrant invalidation under Brosnahan, or whether it would
determine the provisions of Proposition 9 rise to the level of divestment as in Raven. Regardless,
under Raven, if a court were to invalidate a portion of Proposition 9 on the grounds that it
constituted an impermissible revision to the constitution, it is likely that the invalid portion
would be severable.
It is also possible that the foregoing issues could be challenged as a violation of the
separation of powers doctrine or as an impermissible infringement on an essential government
function, both of which are described below.
4. Essential Government Function
The petitioners in Brosnahan also challenged Proposition 8 on the grounds that it was
“invalid as an impermissible impairment of ‘essential government functions.’” Brosnahan v.
Brown, supra, 32 Cal. 3d at 258 (citing Simpson v. Hite, 26 Cal. 2d 125, 134 (1950)). The
proposition under Simpson explains that an initiative may be inapplicable if its effect greatly
impairs or destroys the “efficacy of some other governmental power, the practical application of
which is essential.” Id. In Brosnahan the petitioners challenged Proposition 8 because it placed
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certain restrictions on plea bargaining, granted crime victims an opportunity to appear in both
felony and misdemeanor cases, and imposed greater punishments of defendants whose multiple
offenses are tried separately. Id. at 258-59. The Court concluded that restrictions on plea
bargaining are “not an essential prerequisite to the administration of justice” under Simpson. Id.
Further, the Court determined that objections to more severe sentences and the victim’s right to
be heard in various proceedings also failed the Simpson standard; petitioners’ argument relied
largely on speculation and conjecture that it would erode the justice system. Id. In contrast to
Proposition 8, however, Proposition 9 involves more pronounced constraints on the judiciary and
the Legislature. Proposition 9’s unequivocal constraints on courts with respect to sentencing,
parole, and parole revocation are more profound than in the previous VBR. The standard
articulated in Simpson is more aptly satisfied because Proposition 9 more directly impinges on
essential elements of the administration of justice.
5. Separation of Powers
In Manduley v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 4th 537, petitioners challenged existing law on
the grounds that “the legislative branch unconstitutionally…conferred upon the executive branch
(that is the prosecutor) an exclusively judicial function of choosing the appropriate dispositions
for certain minors convicted of specified crimes.” Id. at 552-53. The Court first explained that
“the separation of powers doctrine prohibits the legislative branch from granting prosecutors the
authority, after charges have been filed, to control the legislatively specified sentencing choices
available to a court.” Id. at 553 (emphasis original). Reiterating this, the Court asserted that
“[w]hen the decision to prosecute has been made, the process which leads to acquittal or to
sentencing is fundamentally judicial in nature.” Id. at 553 (2002) (citing People v. Tenorio 3
Cal. 3d 89 (1970)). However, as Manduley points out, while sentencing options are generally a
function of the judiciary under legislative direction, the power to “choose a particular sentencing
option may be eliminated.” Id.
Post conviction, Proposition 9 would prohibit convicted individuals from being granted
any rights and privileges “not required by any provision of the United States Constitution or by
the laws of this state.” Proposition 9 § 28(a)(5). Concomitantly, it prohibits lessening sentences
through “early release policies intended to alleviate overcrowding in custodial facilities.” Id. §
28(f)(5). Determining sentencing and adjudicating cases after a charge has been brought is a
function of the judiciary. While courts may be confined to sentencing limits, within that
continuum judges are entitled to use their discretion to impose an appropriate punishment. The
language of this provision does not describe potential options, rather, it states what may not be
taken into account or considered. Looking to the language of the provision, it appears as though
the intent is to eliminate some of the judiciary’s discretionary power.
V. POLICY AND FISCAL IMPACT
A. Prison Overcrowding
The adult inmate population was estimated at 171,000 as of May 2008. LAO,
Proposition 9, supra at 2-3. The state prison system is currently experiencing overcrowding
because there are not enough permanent beds available for all inmates. The state operates
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roughly 33 state prisons and other facilities. Gymnasiums and other rooms in state prisons have
been converted to accommodate for the influx of inmates. Id. Currently, courts and the
Legislature are considering various proposals that would reduce overcrowding, including the
early release of inmates from state prison. Id. According to the LAO, the 58 counties of the
state currently spend “over $2.4 billion on county jails, which have a population in excess of
80,000.” Id. at 2. An estimated 20 counties have an inmate population cap imposed by the
federal courts, and 12 other counties observe self-imposed population caps. Id. at 2-3. Inmates
in these counties are sometimes released early to comport with these caps, while other areas use
various methods, including house arrest systems, in order to reduce jail populations. Id.
Though state prisons do not generally release inmates early, Proposition 9 could present
significant impediments should it become necessary to enact legislation to address prison
overcrowding issues. Id. at 4. Proposition 9 would prohibit early release, and expressly
precludes consideration of overcrowding issues. Jails that are forced to deal with prison
overcrowding will likely face significant financial burdens, as well as housing dilemmas, should
Proposition 9’s restrictions on early release pass. Id. at 4-5. According to the LAO, restrictions
on early release could cost the state a considerable amount in continued housing of prisoners as
well as potential restructuring of facilities to accommodate more prisoners. Id. at 4-5.
B. Fiscal Impact
According to the second quarter 2008 facts and figures for the Department of
Corrections, the 2007-08 budget is $9.7 billion.
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Divisions_Boards/Adult_Operations/Facts_and_Figures.html. The total
amount of offenders, both in and out of custody, that fall under the supervision of the California
Department of Corrections is around 318,411 people. Id. Cost to support jobs related to inmates
and parolees, including prison staff, various institutional officers, those supervising parolees, and
those in administration, are $62,961. Id. Moreover, the average yearly cost per inmate is
$35,587 while the cost per parolee is $4,338. Id. The LAO estimates the “costs to operate the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation in 2008-09 are estimated to be
approximately $10 billion, [while] the average annual cost to incarcerate an inmate is estimated
to be about $46,000. LAO, Proposition 9, supra at 2-3.
Ultimately, Proposition 9 could result in “unknown potential increases in state prison and
county jail operating costs due to provisions restricting early release of inmates.” LAO,
Initiatives Fiscal Analysis, Victims’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008: Marsy’s Law, Amdt. #1-NS (A.G.
File No. 07-0100) 5, http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2007/070977.pdf (4 February 2008)
[hereinafter LAO, Fiscal Analysis]. As previously mentioned, state prisons do not generally
release inmates early. Thus, according to the LAO’s Fiscal Analysis, “under current law, the
proposed constitutional amendments would probably have no fiscal effect on the state prison
system.” Id. at 3. However, Proposition 9 could result in serious fiscal consequences should the
voters or Legislature choose to adopt early release programs to address overcrowding issues. Id.
at 3-4. Such costs could “amount to hundreds of millions of dollars annually.” Id.
In terms of jails, some counties do have early release programs. The effects of
Propositon 9 are less certain under these circumstances, and will likely depend on the particular
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situation of each county. The LAO theorizes that counties will probably respond either by “(1)
increasing the pretrial release of offenders, thereby making more room for sentenced offenders to
serve their full terms in jail, or (2) expanding jail operations within new or existing facilities.”
Id. at 4. This in turn may amount to increased cost for various counties.
Likewise, the potential administrative costs are unknown. With Proposition 9’s extensive
notification requirements, the expansive class of people that must receive notice, and the added
procedures that would trigger this notification mandate, the costs could be high. LAO,
Proposition 9, supra at 6. For instance, the expanded rights related to parole and sentencing
hearings, including the amount of people able to testify, could result in prolonged hearings and
lengthy proceedings, thus increasing court costs. Id.
In terms of savings, however, the fiscal analysis points out that the reduction in parole
hearings, as well as the restrictions and prohibition on state provided counsel could potentially
save millions of dollars. LAO, Fiscal Analysis, supra at 4. The fiscal analysis estimates that
“tens of millions of dollars annually in savings could result from the provisions changing parole
revocation procedures, such as by limiting when counsel was provided by the state.” Id.
However, as the LAO analysis acknowledges, some of these changes are likely to be subject to
legal challenges. Id.; LAO, Proposition 9, supra at 5.
Furthermore, under current law, courts retain discretion when determining whether to
impose restitution. Proposition 9, however, will make it mandatory. Further, it will require that
any money collected first go to pay restitution, not recover any court costs. Currently courts
collect certain penalty fees and fines. These contribute to local funds and agencies, including the
Traumatic Brain Injury Fund and the Restitution Fund. Through these, victims receive revenues
collected from offenders. With the mandate that the money first go to restitution, these funds,
including the Restitution Fund, may receive much less. LAO, Proposition 9, supra at 5-6. This,
however, could be counterbalanced in light of possible savings that these state or local agencies
may realize as a result of the victims being paid restitution directly from the wrongdoers, rather
than having to come to those agencies themselves for aid. Id. at 6.
C. Policy Issues
1. Proponents
Proponents argue that Proposition 9 would provide victims with more rights, thereby
alleviating unnecessary suffering that victims have had to endure. Proponents contend that this
simply evens the playing field, elevating certain rights from statutory provisions to the
constitutional level. The Constitution currently provides certain rights for criminals, and victims
should be afforded at least equal guarantees. Argument in Favor of Proposition 9
http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/argu-rebut/argu-rebutt9.htm (2008).
Proposition 9 supporters also assert that this will save money in the long run by
increasing the number of years between parole hearings and truncating already extensive parole
process. Proponents point out that “taxpayers spend millions on hearings for dangerous
criminals that have virtually no chance of release.” Id. To underscore this point, supporters of
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Proposition 9 highlight the fact that two of Charles Manson’s followers, both convicted of
multiple brutal murders, have had 38 parole hearings in 30 years. Id. The injustice here is
punctuated by the fact that families involved have been forced to “relieve the painful crime and
pat their own expenses to attend the hearings,” as well as the fact that taxpayers have had to
subsidize these hearings. Id.
2. Opponents
Opponents argue that Proposition 9 replicates laws that currently exist in statute and
under the California Constitution. According to the opponents, “many of the components in
Proposition 9 – including the requirements that victims be notified of critical points in an
offender’s legal process as well as the rights for victims to be heard throughout the legal process
– were already approved by voters in Proposition 8 in 1982, the Victims’ Bill of Rights.”
Argument Against Proposition 9 http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/argu-rebut/argu-rebutt9.htm
(2008) [hereinafter Argument Against 9]. Additionally, there currently exists a state-funded
Victims of Crime Resource Center to educate victims about their rights and help them through
the process. Rebuttal to Argument in Favor of Proposition 9,
http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/argu-rebut/argu-rebutt9.htm (2008) [hereinafter Rebuttal to
Propositon 9].
Additionally, opponents argue that the State does not generally release inmates early
from prison, and that “California’s parole system is already among the strictest in the United
States.” Argument Against 9, supra. Emphasizing this, opponents of Proposition 9 point out that
“[t]he actual annual parole rate for those convicted of second degree murder or manslaughter has
been less that 1% of those eligible for 20 years.” Id. Given this, opponents contend that
Proposition 9’s “tremendously costly changes to existing parole policy” is unjustified and simply
not needed. Id.
Furthermore, according to one critique, the amendments are “antithetical to parole
consideration hearings’ stated purpose: to determine whether a prisoner poses an actual risk to
society.” Dawood, Proposition 9, supra at 8. According to Dawood’s summary, those testifying
at hearings rarely present actual evidence relating to the prisoner’s “current threat (which the
California Supreme Court…made clear is the only relevant issue in a parole hearing) and thus
this measure is intended to ‘play on the Board’s sympathy.’” Id. Moreover, victims are entitled
to speak last at a parole hearing. Id. at 12. Should the testimony be fabricated or invalid, the
only procedural guard is to allow questions or objections. Should Proposition 9 be ratified,
victims would be permitted to provide uninterrupted, unquestioned testimony. The end result, as
Dawood posits, is that “unproved allegations by victims would be taken as true.” Id.
Critics also highlight the point that Proposition 9 will result in legal battles because it
would “curtail parolees’ due process rights in parole revocation proceedings.” Id. In particular,
Proposition 9 would violate due process rights “required by the U.S. Constitution as interpreted
by the Supreme Court.” Id. Those violations include the following: (1) parolees would spend
longer periods in custody awaiting a hearing to determine whether a parole violation had even
occurred; (2) hearsay evidence would be admitted without cross-examination of adverse
witnesses; and (3) parolees would no longer be entitled to State-appointed counsel. Id.
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VI. FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND BACKING
The majority of funds received in support of Proposition 9 come from Henry T. Nicholas
III, the brother of murder victim Marsy Nicholas, for whom the initiative is named. Secretary of
State, Campaign Finance: Proposition 009 – Criminal Justice System. Victims’ Rights. Parole.
Initiative Constitutional Amendment and Statute., http://calaccess.sos.ca.gov/Campaign/Measures/Detail.aspx?id=1304168&session=2007. He has
contributed just under $5 million. The Yes on Proposition 9 group of contributors and their
estimated contributions include: Friends of Todd Spitzer 2006, $100; Crime Victims United of
California, $100,000; PK Executive Transportation, $500; VIP Limousines & Coaches Inc.,
$1,000; Thomas Dale and Associates, $1,500; Peace Officers Research Association of California
Political Issues Committee, $3,000; Crime Victims United of California, $100,000. Id.
Registered opponents garner their support from a wide range of organizations and
individuals. The contributors and estimated contributions include: Ella Baker Center for Human
Rights, $33,667.62; ACLU of Northern Ca., $2,500; Pace of California Schools Employees
Association – Issues, $50,000; Coalition for an informed California/No on 54, $4,000; CA
Federation of Teachers Cope Prop/Ballot Committee, $100,000; CA State Council of Service
Employees Issue PAC, 247,805; Northern California District Council, ILWU, $100; M. Quinn
Delaney, $15,000; Lillian Henegar, $100; Sacramento Friends Meeting, $50; Labor/Community
Strategy Center, $100; California Teachers Association Issues PAC, $72,006.54; Joseph D.
Ossmann, $100; Michael W. Bien, $500; Glenn Backes, $500; American Friends Service
Committee, $1,000; Robert Shapazian, $100; Elena J. Morris, $150; and California Professional
Firefighters Ballot Issues, $6,006. Id.
VI. CONCLUSION
The main thrust of this initiative is to enhance current victims’ rights. Proposition 9 will
provide more expansive rights pertaining to, inter alia, notification of, attendance and the right to
be heard at sentencing and parole hearings. In large part, Proposition 9 elevates already existing
rights to the constitutional level. Notwithstanding the reaffirmation of preexisting laws, this
measure also adds significant provisions to the current VBR and to present statutes. Proposition
9 significantly broadens the privileges of victims, particularly with regard to the right to refuse
discovery requests, as well as to confer with prosecutors. Contemporaneously, Proposition 9
would unequivocally curtail the rights criminal defendants and parolees. In certain situations,
Proposition 9 would abridge the right to counsel, the right to confront witnesses, and the right to
discovery. It may also prolong sentences and the period in which parolees are in custody
awaiting a parole violation hearing.
Abrogating the right to a State appointed attorney for a parole revocation hearing, as well
as reducing parole hearings could result in significant savings. However, additional
administrative costs expended to comply with notice requirements and to house inmates for
longer periods may counteract such savings. Furthermore, Proposition 9 could result in
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voluminous litigation as a result of various challenges brought on the basis that this initiative
violates federal and state constitutional provisions, and because it conflicts with preexisting laws.
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